Some obscure judgments deserve a wider audience.

Master Sanderson of the Western Australia Supreme Court delivered one such gem in April in Rohanna Pty Ltd v Nu-Steel Homes Adelaide Pty Ltd [2013] WASC 109.

Some scene-setting first.

In Christmas week 2012 the plaintiff received two statutory demands from the defendant. The parties had never had any prior contact with each other and yet the demands totalled almost $220,000. Both stat demands were ultimately set aside by Master Sanderson. In the interim the defendant was represented in correspondence by a South Australian solicitor who did not file a formal appearance (Mr Nicholls) and in Court by a non-lawyer (Mr Pearse). Mr Nicholls had offered to settle the matter on the basis that the plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of $25,000. He also remarked upon the need to advertise any winding up application which might follow if the plaintiff didn’t stump up that loot.

Master Sanderson was scathing. Here are some highlights from a stinging judgment.

11.   In further support of its application the plaintiff filed a second affidavit …. The purpose of this affidavit was to demonstrate the solvency of the plaintiff. A mere glance at this affidavit would be enough to convince even the economically illiterate the plaintiff was solvent. Indeed it shows the plaintiff as a massively successful commercial enterprise. But that was not enough for Mr McNamara.

 

       ….

 

17.   All of these matters can then be aggregated. First, the defendant served the statutory demands without any prior consultation with the plaintiff. If it had a genuine belief there was a debt owed it would have been reasonable to write to the plaintiff, make a claim and explain the basis of that claim. That was not done. Instead the demands were sent by post and arrived on the Thursday before Christmas. If ever there was a time when it was difficult to deal expeditiously with a demand which required action within 21 days, that was it.

 

 ….

 

20.   Fourthly, faced with clear evidence of the solvency of the plaintiff the defendant determined to press on. No reasonable party properly advised would have done so.

 

21.   Fifthly, the correspondence suggests an attempt to embarrass the plaintiff by advertising the fact of a winding up application. There was no need to refer to the advertising of a winding up application in the way Mr McNamara did. The letter strongly suggests the defendant was looking to force the plaintiff into a compromise to serve its own purposes.

 

22.  Sixthly, the defendant actually issued a winding up application. This was done prior to the application to set aside the demands being heard. It must have been clear there was a live issue as to whether the application to restrain the defendant would succeed. … Once again it looks as though the defendant was attempting to pressure the plaintiff.

 

23.   Seventhly, no appearance to the application to set aside the demands was ever lodged. Mr McNamara in his correspondence said he had been retained by the defendant. As late as 28 February 2013 he wrote to the plaintiff’s solicitors on behalf of the defendant. At no time did Mr McNamara indicate his instructions had been terminated and at no time did he give any indication he would not appear at the hearing of the matter on 7 March 2013. Perhaps the defendant was concerned if it did enter an appearance a costs order might be made against it. Or perhaps there was some other reason no appearance was entered. But it does suggest the defendant never took seriously the prospect it could successfully resist the plaintiff’s application.

 

24.   Finally, there is the offer to settle on payment of $25,000 for costs. It may be that Mr McNamara is one of South Australia’s leading corporate lawyers. If that is so, this case does not represent his finest hour. But even assuming high competence on the part of Mr McNamara there is no possible way the defendant’s costs could have amounted to $25,000. No appearance was filed, no affidavits in opposition to the application were lodged, it would appear submissions to be made on behalf of the defendant were drawn by Mr Pearse and the totality of Mr McNamara’s involvement was three or four letters. Really this demand for ‘costs’ is no such thing. It was tantamount to extortion.

 

25.   … This is a case where indemnity costs should be awarded and the only question is who should pay those costs. Mr Pearse will have 14 days from the publication of these reasons to make submissions as to why he should not pay the costs personally.

 

26.   I intend to refer these reasons to the Western Australian Police Service for such action as they deem necessary in relation to Mr Pearse. I will also refer a copy of these reasons to the authorities in South Australia who regulate the legal profession to take such action as they deem appropriate in relation to Mr McNamara.

 

Lessons from this case? Many.

But the very first that occurs to me is that the Wild West’s legal system might have been unfairly maligned by the late Robert Hughes (as recorded in my post here on his passing).