Monthly Archives: May 2015

Mitigation, GST and intersections; should defendants pay plaintiffs’ claims on a GST-inclusive or exclusive basis?

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Mr Millington drove through a red light and hit a garbage truck. His insurer admitted as much.  It also accepted liability entirely. And it admitted that the garbage truck’s owner had incurred repair costs and associated losses of almost $50,000. But it baulked at paying that amount in damages.

So the garbo sued.

Millington’s insurer defended. It argued that the garbo’s claim was based on GST-inclusive amounts such as the total of the repairer’s invoice. As a business, the insurer reasoned, the garbage collector should inevitably get a GST input credit for one eleventh of such GST-inclusive totals and hence the true ultimate cost to the garbo was only ten-elevenths (i.e. the GST-exclusive amount) of the amounts that the garbo was claiming in court.

The plaintiff garbo dug in. It answered that while it was entitled to a GST input credit for the GST in the repair bill etc, it did not intend actually claiming that credit. And besides, even if it was to claim the GST input credit, why should it be out-of-pocket for the period between paying the GST-inclusive repair bills etc and the taxman’s subsequent allowance of the input credit from those bills?

The Supreme Court and the Magistrates’ Court gave different answers.

At first instance, the Magistrates’ Court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff the GST-inclusive total claim but it also ordered that the plaintiff subsequently refund to the defendant an amount equal to the GST content of the claim.

The defendant (or rather Mr Millington’s insurer in his name) then appealed to the Supreme Court.

The decision was handed down last month in Millington v Waste Wise Environmental Pty Ltd [2015] VSC 167.  Ironically, by the time the appeal got to the Supreme Court, the parties had actually agreed that the appeal should succeed but Croft J. applied the brakes. He observed that superior courts could not simply overturn inferior court orders by consent of the parties so he required submissions from the parties and allowed the involvement of an amicus curiae.

The appeal had three grounds.

Firstly, the Millington camp contended that the magistrate’s orders for separate payments in opposite directions offended the “once and for all” rule for damages awards. Croft J. agreed (although he noted a certain elasticity in that rule at the conclusion of a review of authorities which he characterised as tending to muddy already opaque waters).

Secondly, the appellant argued that the magistrate’s orders offended the compensatory principle (i.e. the object of an award of damages is to provide a sum of money the effect of which is to place the party who was injured in the same position they would have been in if they had not sustained the wrong for which they are being compensated). Again Croft J. agreed (although in obiter he noted the possibility that interest on a GST input might be properly claimable for the period the plaintiff was out of pocket for that amount).

Finally, the appellant argued that the magistrate was wrong when he adopted the view that the plaintiff was under a positive duty to mitigate its loss. Once more Croft J. agreed. “No such positive duty [to mitigate loss] exists,” he said. However “… the correct application of the law relating to the mitigation of loss in this instance requires that that the award of damages be reduced to the extent that [the plaintiff] has not acted reasonably in claiming the input credits to which it was entitled.”

The lessons from this case? Three occur to me:

  • The financial measure of a defendant’s liability will often vary (plus or minus approximately 10 per cent) depending on the GST status of the particular plaintiff;
  • The “duty to mitigate loss” might be a technical mis-description but that is probably of little practical significance. The broad underlying concept that plaintiffs cannot recover damages for losses they have incurred unreasonably remains alive and well; and
  • If even garbage trucks need to be careful when approaching green lights at intersections the rest of us need to be very cautious indeed.

(Thanks to my friend and colleague Sam Hopper for pointing this case out to me after noticing that one of the authorities cited in it was the matter in which we first met.)

Retail tenant wins VCAT fight but gets nil damages and an adverse costs order

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VCAT’s no costs presumption is more elastic in some parts of the tribunal than in others.

In building cases, the losers commonly pay the winners’ costs. In retail tenancies disputes the losers very rarely do. But the winner paying the loser’s costs? Calderbanks and their equivalents aside, it is almost unheard of  anywhere at VCAT or beyond it.

So imagine the winner’s chagrin in the retail tenancies case of 24 Hour Fitness Pty Ltd v W & B Investment Group Pty Ltd [2015] VCAT 596 when it won the liability stoush, produced an expert report seeking just over $3m in damages and then received nothing but an order to pay the ostensible loser’s costs.

The case is an illustration of one of the hazards of compartmentalising a single business within separate corporate vehicles.

24 Hour Fitness Pty Ltd was the tenant. A gym operated on the premises. Unremarkably, the landlord understood that the tenant owned the gym.

Back in 2013, the tenant claimed the landlord had breached a provision of the lease. VCAT agreed. The matter was eventually relisted three years later for an assessment of damages the tenant had suffered by reason of the landlord’s breach.

But in March this year, on day 1 of what was to have been a five-day hearing, the evidentiary penny dropped.

The tenant had never owned or operated the gym (or even any other business). Instead, a company associated with the tenant, ran the gym business. That associated company was a complete stranger to the lease. It occupied the premises and operated the gym entirely without the landlord’s knowledge or permission. Its business might have suffered by reason of the landlord’s non-compliance with the lease but, being a stranger to the lease, it couldn’t recover from the landlord for that contractual breach.

And because the ostensible tenant had no direct interest in the business which claimed to have suffered the financial loss, it could not show any compensable loss referable to the landlord’s breach either.

In the costs decision published last month, Judge Jenkins took a dim view of the tenant conflating itself, its associated company and the associated company’s business for the purposes of the VCAT litigation.

Necessarily, her starting point was s. 92 of the Retail Leases Act 2003. That section proscribes costs orders in VCAT retail tenancy disputes unless a party has “conducted the proceeding in a vexatious way that unnecessarily disadvantaged the other party to the proceeding”. (The other exception, refusal to participate sufficiently in mediation or ADR, did not arise.)

What does “vexatious” mean? The tribunal’s answer includes a handy survey of authorities dealing with exceptional costs orders in both courts and tribunals and (at para 19) this checklist of matters to be taken into account when considering whether to order indemnity costs:

  1.  Whether a party has been forced to take legal proceedings entirely through the wrongful or inappropriate conduct of the other party;
  2. Whether an action has been commenced or continued in circumstances where the applicant, properly advised, should have known he had no chance of success;
  3. Where a party persists in what should, on proper consideration, be seen to be a hopeless case;
  4. Whether the party against whom indemnity costs are sought has made a false allegation of fraud;
  5. Particular misconduct that causes a loss of time to the Court and the parties;
  6. Commencing or continuing proceedings for an ulterior motive or in wilful disregard of known facts or clearly established law; 
  7. Making allegations which ought never to have been made or undue prolongation of a case by groundless contentions; and
  8. An imprudent refusal of an offer of compromise.

Judge Jenkins found five of the eight matters on that list present in the case before her. She ordered the tenant to pay the landlord’s costs relating to the preparation of the damages hearing dating all the way back to 2013.

The tenant did have one minor win. The landlord had asked for indemnity costs but failed. Judge Jenkins found there was insufficient evidence to justify an inference that the tenant was motivated in its claim by an ulterior motive. She held that indemnity costs were reserved “for the most exceptional circumstances” and that solicitor and client costs (which she suggested were similar if not equivalent to standard basis costs) would suffice.

The lesson? If a lease (or any other type of contract for that matter) has been breached but the resulting loss has been suffered by a stranger to that agreement, any resulting commercial litigation might not be very commercial at all.

ADDENDUM: The Court of Appeal subsequently upheld Judge Jenkin’s decision. See my brief blog on the appeal decision here.