Victorian Supreme Court costs – the party/party is over

No April Fool’s Day jokes please.

Effective 1 April 2013 the Victorian Supreme Court has a new costs regime.

The highlights:

  • The ‘party and party basis’ (by which most Supreme Court cost bills have historically been taxed) is axed.
  • Henceforth, costs orders will generally be taxed on the more generous ‘solicitor and client basis’ (that is “all costs reasonably incurred and of reasonable amount”) although that yardstick is to be renamed the ‘standard basis.’
  • Costs on an indemnity basis remain available.
  • Solicitors’ time on the standard basis will be claimable in 6 minute units at the rate of $36 + GST per unit (ie $360 + GST per hour).
  • Unless otherwise ordered, the maximum daily allowance for counsel is $5000 + GST per day for juniors and $7500 + GST per day for silks.
  • Photocopying (currently allowable at a whopping $2.30 per page) becomes discretionary but is likely to be allowed in the Costs Court at 22 cents per printed side of page.

For a more detailed explanation of the new costs regime see:

What do the changes mean?

It is probably good news for successful litigants. Any standard costs order in their favour should now translate into more coin in their pocket than was formerly likely under the more austere party and party basis.

It is correspondingly bad news for unsuccessful litigants (by which I include others such as winners who fail to beat their opponents’ Calderbank offers or Offers of Compromise).

And it’s likely business as usual for those practitioners of the dark arts of costs consulting.

How Edelsten’s costs application against solis backfired

Last October I posted about Dr Edelsten’s adventures in the Supreme Court of Victoria against a lady friend in (Mainly) keeping a sugar daddy’s confidences.

A quick reminder. In an entertaining but unflattering judgment Dr Edelsten won an order for $US5000 plus certain limited suppression orders against a Ms da Silva.

Among other things, Beach J found that “most of the evidence given by the defendant was demonstrably false and could not be believed. However, Dr Edelsten was no more an impressive witness than Ms da Silva.”

Now the aftermath (which escaped me among the distractions of the summer holidays).

The week before Christmas Dr Edelsten went back to court and sought his costs of the litigation against the defendant’s solicitors – on an indemnity basis.

Among other things, he relied upon the Civil Procedure Act.

He argued that swathes of the defendant’s case had no proper basis, her solicitors must have known this and therefore they should not have persisted with key aspects of the defendants’ case.

Beach J was not swayed.

“I am satisfied that at all times … the defendant’s solicitors were acting on the instructions of the defendant. Indeed, when the defence was eventually abandoned, it was abandoned in the face of the defendant’s evidence to the contrary.

… Having regard to the instructions the defendant’s solicitors then possessed, I see nothing improper, or in breach of any rule of conduct, or in breach of any overarching obligation or other provision of the Civil Procedure Act, in the drawing, settling and filing of the defendant’s defence. …

It is always possible to say that an issue, upon which it becomes clear that a party will ultimately be unsuccessful, could have been abandoned earlier if greater diligence had been exercised. However, the mere failure to abandon a point at the earliest possible time does not mandate a conclusion that an overarching obligation of the Civil Procedure Act has been breached.

…. In the end, I have come to the conclusion that while a counsel of perfection would have suggested that the concession made on the afternoon of the third day of the trial could (and possibly should) have been made 24 hours earlier, the failure to take this step at that time did not involve the contravention of any of the overarching obligations in the Civil Procedure Act.

And the ordeal was not yet over.  Beach J concluded with an order that Dr Edelsten pay the solicitors’ costs of his failed application on a solicitor /client basis (apparently because the judge considered the application had been sufficiently hopeless to warrant costs on more than the usual party/party basis).

The costs decision is here.